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Abstract—The security of cryptographic communication proto-
cols that use X.509 certificates depends on the correctness of those
certificates. This paper proposes a system that helps to ensure
the correct operation of an X.509 certification authority and
its registration authorities. We achieve this goal by enforcing a
policy-defined, multi-party validation and authorization workflow
of certificate signing requests. Besides, our system offers full
accountability for this workflow for forensic purposes. As a
foundation for our implementation, we leverage the distributed
ledger and smart contract framework Hyperledger Fabric. Our
implementation inherits the strong tamper-resistance of Fabric
which strengthens the integrity of the computer processes that
enforce the validation and authorization of the certificate signing
request, and of the metadata collected during certificate issuance.
Index Terms—Identity management, X.509, distributed ledger,
policy-based security
I. MOTIVATION
X.509 [1] is a widely used standard that specifies a public
key infrastructure and the format of public key certificates.
X.509 certificates are issued by Certificate Authorities (CA)
and bind the identity of an entity to the public part of an
asymmetric key pair owned by that entity. An example of such
a binding is the link between a Web server’s URL and its
public key, or between a person’s name, e-mail address, and
her public key. To prove authenticity, certificates are digitally
signed by a CA.
X.509 certificates are used in a variety of cryptographic
communication protocols and help to achieve the security goals
of confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. For this reason,
X.509 must be regarded as a cornerstone of network security.
However, the security of communication protocols that use
certificates depends on the correctness of those certificates.
Unfortunately, situations can occur that lead to authentic
certificates that are either incorrect (due to a mistake) or even
fraudulent (due to an attack). In both cases, the above security
goals are harmed as the identity claimed in such a certificate
and the public key it contains do not belong to the same entity.
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The attack vectors that can lead to incorrect/fraudulent
certificates include Registration Authorities (RA) who validate
Certificate Signing Requests (CSR) on behalf of a CA. This
process typically involves a human RA member who is prone
to mistakes or may even act maliciously. Furthermore, RA
members use applications running on computers to commu-
nicate with the CA that can be compromised if not properly
secured [2]. Finally, CAs themselves might be improperly
secured, risking compromise of the CA’s signing key that leads
to extensive abuse [3].
In this paper, we focus on improving the correct operation of
an X.509 CA and its RAs. In this context, ”correct” means that
only correctly validated certificates are issued by the CA. We
propose a solution that provides both increased robustness of
the certificate issuance process and accountability for forensic
purposes. Forensic analyses are, for instance, helpful to identify
compromised or malicious RA members. The certification
process is improved by enforcing a policy-defined, multi-party
validation and authorization workflow of CSRs that involves
more than just one RA member. Our system was designed
to run on top of the distributed ledger and smart contract
framework Hyperledger Fabric [4]. This framework provides
us strong tamper-resistance concerning the integrity of computer
processes that enforce the CSR validation and authorization,
and of collected accounting information.
In this work, we will mainly refer to corporate CAs that issue
S/MIME certificates for e-mail communication [5]. However,
our findings can be applied to other scenarios.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In Section II
we provide background information on X.509 certificate
issuance and Hyperledger Fabric. Next, we analyze and
detail security problems related to CAs and RAs, and define
requirements for a suitable solution in Section III. The design
and implementation of our system are described in Section IV.
We discuss our work in Section V and compare it to related
work in Section VI. The paper is concluded in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides information on X.509 certificate
issuance and the Hyperledger Fabric framework.
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A. Validation Process of an X.509 Certificate Signing Request
Certificate Authorities (CA) impose strict rules on their
Registration Authorities (RA) that describe how certificate
signing requests (CSR) must be validated before the certificate
can be signed. As an example, we describe the validation
process of a CSR for an S/MIME certificate imposed by the
CA of the German National Research and Education Network
(DFN-PKI [6]). The DFN-PKI is frequently used by German
universities and other research institutions, and is a sub-CA of
the Deutsche Telekom CA.
As a first step, the certificate requester generates a new
asymmetric key pair and a CSR, which contains the public
key, the requester’s name, and e-mail address. The CSR is then
transmitted to the CA.
The requester must now meet in person with one member
of her university’s or department’s RA who then validates the
CSR. The RA member checks the requester’s identity using
an official identity document and whether the requester is the
owner of the claimed e-mail address. The RA member fills out
a paper form documenting the validation process and notes the
last digits of the serial number of the submitted identification
document to prove that he or she has verified the identification
document. Finally, the paper form is signed by the certificate
requester and RA member, and filed by the RA.
After having validated the CSR, the RA member authorizes
it using an application installed on her computer. The CA
now issues the new certificate and delivers it by e-mail to the
certificate requester.
B. Hyperledger Fabric
Hyperledger Fabric [4] is a private and permissioned
distributed ledger and smart contract framework developed by
the Hyperledger project of the Linux Foundation [7].
A distributed ledger is “a type of database that is spread
across multiple sites”. Its “records are stored one after the
other in a continuous ledger” and “can only be added when the
participants reach a quorum” [8, p. 17]. For these reasons,
distributed ledgers are append-only and provide improved
protection of data integrity and availability compared to
centralized approaches.
Chaincode is a concept of Fabric comparable to smart
contracts known from public blockchains such as Ethereum [9].
It can be used to implement any business logic and its unique
feature is that multiple instances on different nodes of a Fabric
network. Chaincode can be executed by Fabric clients by
sending transactions into the Fabric network. In this way,
clients can manipulate the state of the distributed ledger, e.g.,
create a new data structure representing an asset or create
a modified version (an update) of an existing one. However,
only if a certain, policy-defined number of chaincode instances
endorse the transaction, the state of the distributed ledger will
change. Through this transaction approval model, Fabric offers
Byzantine fault-tolerant execution of processes.
III. PROBLEM ANALYSIS AND REQUIREMENTS
This section defines attack vectors on X.509 certificate
issuance and defines requirements on a solution able to mitigate
these.
A. Attack Vectors
As a first step, we want to exemplarily analyze the X.509
certificate issuance workflow of the DFN-PKI, introduced in
Section II-A, for possible attack vectors (AV).
AV1: Compromising a CA: The CA, as a black box entity,
was manipulated in a way that results in the issuance of an
authentic certificate with fraudulent content. For instance, the
attacker obtained access to the CA’s private key and can sign
fraudulent certificates without any further authorization. [3]
AV2: Compromising an RA Member: The technical
infrastructure used by an honest RA member, such as his
client computer, was manipulated in a way that leads to the
authorization of an incorrect or fraudulent CSR. [2]
AV3: Negligent RA Member: An error of an honest RA
member results in the unintended authorization of an incorrect
or fraudulent CSR.
AV4: Malicious RA Member: A dishonest RA member
intentionally authorizes a fraudulent CSR.
B. Requirements
The goal of this work is to prevent that the attack vectors
defined in Section III-A can be exploited to issue incorrect or
fraudulent certificates. In addition, we want to collect metadata
for forensic analyses that, for instance, allow the identification
of malicious RA members. To achieve this goal, our solution
must meet the following requirements (R):
R1: Multi-party CSR Validation: The validation of a
CSR must not depend on only one RA member. Instead, the
validation of a CSR must be performed by multiple parties,
i.e. two or more RA members.
R2: Tamper-Resistant Enforcement of the Certificate
Issuance Workflow: Computer processes that enforce the
validation workflow of a CSR and finally authorize certificate
issuance must be tamper-resistance.
R3: Accountability of CSR Validation: The validation
workflow of a CSR (validating RA member’s identity, verified
target identity, etc, ...) must be logged transparently.
R4: Accountability of Certificate Issuance: When a
certificate is signed by a CA, its issuance must be logged
transparently.
R5: Tamper-Resistance of Accountability Information:
Metadata collected during CSR validation and certificate
issuance must be protected concerning data integrity and
availability.
IV. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
This section gives an overview of our system and describes
technically the interaction between users, system and CA.
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Fig. 1. System overview and interactions between entities
A. Overview
Figure 1 depicts an overview of our system and the
interactions between entities, which follows the certificate
issuance process explained in Section II-A.
The core of our system is the distributed ledger-based
Certification Control System (CCS), which orchestrates and
controls the certificate issuance process. The CCS is equipped
with a Certification Policy that expresses conditions that must
be met before a CSR is regarded as being authorized as well
as permissions of RA members.
Permissions specify which RA members are allowed to
validate and endorse specific CSRs. For instance, RA1 is
responsible for CSRs belonging to subdomain x, RA2 is
responsible for subdomain y. This prevents an RA member from
endorsing a CSR of a domain for which she is not responsible.
Conditions express, for example, how many (and which) RA
members must have individually endorsed a CSR before it is
finally considered to be authorized. This is useful to enforce a
more thorough validation of CSRs that, for instance, belong
to certificate requesters with stronger security demands.
Throughout the entire certificate issuance process (handing
in the CSR, its multi-party validation, its authorization, and
signing the certificate), metadata is collected and persisted in
the distributed ledger underlying the CCS, making the entire
process fully accountable.
B. Implementation
We have implemented our CCS in chaincode that runs on
nodes of a Hyperledger Fabric network. This chaincode creates
and updates various data structures stored in the distributed
ledger that model users, CSRs and certificates, see Figure 2,
RA members, the certification policy and other concepts. The
chain code is also used to determine whether a specific CSR
can be considered authorized. We will now detail how our
system uses chaincode to process user input and enforce a
policy-defined CSR validation process.
A new CSR is submitted for validation to the CCS by a
Certificate Requester using a user-specific application. The app
sends a createCSR transaction to the appropriate chaincode
running on the Fabric network whose purpose it is to add a
new CSR record to the User record related to the certificate
requester. Before this transaction can be executed it needs to
be endorsed by chaincode, see steps 1–3 in Figure 3.
A CSR record contains a unique ID (CSRID), a list of
RAEndorsement records, and finally the authorized flag.
This flag indicates the status of a CSR and is initially set to
false to indicate that the authorization process is incomplete.
When the user meets with an RA member, the RA member
retrieves the User record of that user that contains the CSR
from the ledger using an RA-specific app. Now, the RA member
performs various validation steps as discussed in Section II-A
and creates a RAEndorsement record for documentation
purposes. Finally, the record is signed by the RA member to
prove authenticity, see steps 5–7.
To add the RAEndorsement record to the related CSR
record, the RA member’s app sends an endorseCSR transac-
tion into the Fabric network. Again, chaincode must endorse
the transaction, i.e., check if this RA member is authorized
to validate this CSR. To do this, the chaincode retrieves the
permissions of the RA member from the data structures that
model the certification policy. The chaincode also validates the
signature of the RAEndorsement record and finally adds the
RAEndorsement record to the CSR record, see steps 8–10.
After processing the endorseCSR transaction, the chain-
code also checks whether the conditions are already met to
regard the CSR as being authorized, i.e. if a sufficient number of
RA members have successfully validated the CSR. Optionally,
the chaincode can also perform plausibility checks for data
contained in the different RAEndorsement records in the
last step. Such checks can be used, for example, to verify that
the data about the certificate requester provided by different RA
members is identical. If all checks are successful, the chaincode
sets the authorized flag of the CSR record to true, which
concludes the verification and authorization process of this
Fig. 2. User-centered data model of the certificate issuance process (simplified)
CSR, see steps 11 and 12. Otherwise, the certificate requester
must meet with another RA member.
Finally, the CA retrieves the now authorized CSR record
from the ledger and issues the certificate. The certificate is
added as a Certificate record to the User record and
retrieved by the certificate requester’s app, see Steps 13–20.
Fig. 3. Interaction of entities and processing of user input (simplified)
V. DISCUSSION
This section discusses whether our system meets the require-
ments defined in Section III-B, how well the attack vectors
from Section III-A are mitigated, and further properties. Table I
gives an overview which attack vector is covered by which
required system property.
If specified by the Certification Policy, the verification of a
CSR is performed by multiple RA members. This approach
offers improved protection against mistakes and fraud (R1).
The exact number of how many compromised or malicious RA
members, or how many flaws of RA members can be tolerated,
depends on the Certification Policy the system uses. As a rule
of thumb, the more costs are invested in the form of trained
personnel involved in the CSR validation, the more tolerant
the system becomes to failures. As a failure, we define the
issuance of an incorrect or fraudulent certificate.
Formula 1 quantifies the probability of a failure more
precisely using simple combinatorics. n denotes the total
number of RA members, m the number of malicious RA
members, and v is the number of unanimous and successful
CSR validations required by the system.
Pfail =
(
m
v
)
/
(
n
v
)
(1)
To provide a numerical example, let us assume that n = 10
RA members exist, that m = 3 of them are malicious, and that
v = 3 unanimous and successful CSR validations are required
by the certification policy. In this case, the probability of a
failure Pfail is about 1%. Obviously, if more unanimous and
successful CSR validations are requested by the system as
malicious RA members exist, no failures can occur anymore
(e.g. n = 10, m = 3, v = 4, Pfail = 0), as not enough
malicious RA members exist to support the fraudulent CSR.
In a scenario with an increased number of malicious
or compromised RA members, Pfail will inevitably rise.
However, if an incorrect or fraudulent certificate is created
and discovered later, metadata collected by our system will
allow the identification of RA members involved in its issuance.
If it is determined that an RA member is repeatedly involved
in the issuance of incorrect/fraudulent certificates, she can be
retrained or removed from the system to prevent further harm.
Our system is implemented in chaincode running on a Fabric
network (R2). Individual nodes, on which chaincode instances
run, are of course capable of cheating. However, as long as
there are honest nodes in the network, attacks on the CCS
involve cheating Fabric nodes can be tolerated similarly to
cheating RA members.
Requirements R3 and R4 (accountability of CSR validation
and certificate issuance) are met because actions of all involved
entities require transactions that update the distributed ledger
with respective metadata. This logged metadata is also strongly
protected concerning integrity and availability (R5), as the
distributed Fabric network replicates the data and protects it
against unauthorized modification.
So far, we argued that our system satisfies R1–R5 and
protects against failures resulting from AV2–AV4. However,
we have to note that our system is inherently unable to prevent
failures caused by direct attacks on the CA that, e.g., result
in the attacker having access to the CA’s private key (AV1).
However, for certificates issued directly, no validation history
that consists of data elements signed by RA members is stored
in the distributed ledger. If the correctness of a certificate in in
question, the ledger can be queried comparable to a Certificate
Transparency [10] log, also see Section VI. If it is determined
that there is no data about the certificate, it can be revoked in
further steps.
Performance of a system influences user acceptance. In a
previous paper [11], we presented a performance evaluation
of Fabric, which indicates that, depending on network size,
topology and other parameters, Fabric will be able to cope
with the workload of our system without causing a noticeable
additional delay in the certification process. However, several
TABLE I
ATTACK VECTOR COVERAGE BY SYSTEM PROPERTIES
AV1 AV2 AV3 AV4
R1    
R2    
R3    
R4  
R5    
steps of the certification process involve the input of humans
and are intentionally designed to be redundant for security
reasons. This approach clearly leads to a high level of
commitment on the part of the certificate requesters and the
RA. For this reason, a good balance between security and user
acceptance needs to be found.
The last interesting property we want to discuss results from
using Fabric: In a setting comparable to the DFN-PKI, the
CCS can be distributed across the stakeholders that use it, e.g.
different universities. This distribution is advantageous because
it avoids a centralized organization that its members have to
trust. For this reason, the robustness of the resulting Fabric
network and thereby of our system is increased as it becomes
more difficult to manipulate a considerable amount of Fabric
nodes that execute chaincode.
VI. RELATED WORK
This section analyzes related work in the field and compares
it to ours. We begin with standardized additions to the X.509
landscape and continue with alternative approaches.
Certificate Transparency (CT) [10] provides a public log
of certificates. The log entries are added either by CAs after
issuing a new certificate or by clients (like Web browsers) that
have received a certificate from a (Web) server.
Clients that want to validate a certificate presented by a
server can query the CT log. If the log contains a different
certificate, the client has a strong indicator that there is an
issue with the received certificate.
CT is an after-the-fact solution since it cannot prevent a
CA from issuing an incorrect certificate. In that respect, our
solution differs from CT as it can prevent the misissuance of
certificates in certain cases as discussed earlier. If a CA has been
compromised and the attacker had direct access to the CA’s
signing key, our solution offers a service comparable to CT,
since clients validating a certificate can query the distributed
ledger of our system comparable to a CT log.
Instant Karma PKI (IKP) [12] is an approach that follows
the idea to incentivize diligence and correct behavior of X.509
CAs. Using Ethereum [9] smart contracts, CAs deposit money
in the form of the Ethereum cryptocurrency and agree on
paying a penalty in case they misissued a certificate to an
illegitimate entity. This agreed penalty is split and paid out to
the owner of the identity affected and to the entity that found
the incorrect certificate and reported it to IKP.
IKP and our work share similar goals, i.e., to prevent
certificates from being misissued. However, the way how this
objective is realized differs. We take a more technical approach
that hardens various aspects of certificate issuance. IKP creates
a stimulus for CAs to increase security but does not answer
the question of how this goal can be achieved.
uPort [13] and Sovrin [14] are solutions for self-sovereign
ID management that leverage a web-of-trust approach. uPort
allows users to assign signed pieces of information (so called
credentials) to their own or a foreign digital identity. A
credential, for instance, can be information about the user,
such as her name, address, age, or public key.
Credentials can be made accessible by the user to applica-
tions or organizations, for instance, to provide their name and
address as part of a registration process for a service. uPort
stores identities in the Ethereum blockchain [9] and uses smart
contracts to manage identities, Sovrin is based on Indy [15], a
further distributed ledger-based framework of Hyperledger [7].
Besides sharing the common idea of using
blockchains/distributed ledgers as a secure base, our
project differs from uPort and Sovrin in that we want to
improve the security of X.509-based identity management,
uPort and Sovrin are developing an alternative technology.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a solution that improves the secure
and correct operation of X.509 CAs and RAs by enforcing
a policy-defined, multi-party validation and authorization
workflow of CSR by involving more than just one RA member.
Besides, our system provides accountability for the CSR
validation process for forensic purposes. Because our system
runs on the distributed ledger and smart contract framework
Hyperledger Fabric, it is tamper-resistant, both in terms of
the integrity of the computer processes that control certificate
issuance and the integrity of collected metadata.
Compared to related work, our work helps to actively
prevent the misissuance of certificates in case RA members are
malicious or compromised. Besides, our system is also useful
as an after-the-fact solution if the CA itself got compromised or
too many RA members are fraudulent. In such cases, collected
metadata helps to identify fraudulent certificates or malicious
RA members.
In future work, we plan to refine our prototype and increase
its modularity to allow flexible adaption of the system to
different scenarios, like IoT environments. Furthermore, we
are working on a mechanism based on threshold cryptography
to decentralize the actual signing of the certificate to reduce
the risk of the CA’s signing key being easily compromised.
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